Phase A of the identity pipeline (FABRIC-3.md §F.2/§F.16, §F.13):
- New include/starkernel/vm_identity.h: VMIdentity{owner_pubkey[32],
installed, acl_caps}, its own header per the project's "give real-shaped
data its own header" convention (VMUuid's own precedent), embedded by
value on struct VM. acl_caps is an independent capability bitmask, not
an ordered privilege tier (decided 2026-08-28) -- Zuse isn't a
structurally special VM, her identity just has every bit set
(VM_IDENTITY_CAP_ALL). No individual capability bits assigned yet,
deliberate slack matching blk_meta_t's own acl_reserved precedent --
real bits get names once the operation they gate (BINDSTEP, MINT, ...)
actually gets built.
- Applied the devblock-1 relocation decided in §F.13: new
HOMEBLOCKS_SIG_START_FBLOCK constant (homeblocks_sig.h), repl.c's
homeblocks_sig_check() call site updated from the literal 0. Also
applied the still-owed blockmap_offset/blockmap_devblocks ->
identity_src_offset/identity_src_devblocks rename decided in §F.6 (no
other code referenced the old names). Updated the header's own stale
GPT-relative doc comments to match -- GPT was dropped permanently, this
location is final, not an interim stand-in.
Verified live on all three architectures: clean compile, clean boot to
ok>, Hermes/Artemis both confirmed live with no KILL (no regression from
last session's session-less fix). One pre-existing, unrelated anomaly
observed consistently on all three arches, not caused by this change (no
code touched here intersects Zuse's own fence-write path): "Zuse: minted
but fence write FAILED (not persistent)" -- flagged for its own
investigation, not chased here.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019ZGkimpfyh63EZyRkNbkPD
Cert storage expanded from the old 16-byte placeholder to a real
32-byte seed + 32-byte pubkey. vm_zuse_cert_install() now has a
kernel-side duplicate in src/starkernel/vm/vm_core.c -- the kernel
build's VM_EXCLUDE list drops src/vm.c entirely (same reason
vm_set_base() already has two independent copies), so the hosted-only
version added earlier this session was never actually linked into the
kernel. FORTH-side ZUSE-CERT-LO@/HI@ replaced with ZUSE-PUBKEY@ (i -- u)
over the public half only; ACL-ZUSE-BOOT now checks
ZUSE-CERT-INSTALLED? before authenticating instead of unconditionally.
Attempted NVRAM-based persistence (GetVariable/SetVariable) for the
first-boot mint flow: page-faulted inside OVMF's variable service
(CR2 in the flash MMIO window). Moving the call site to match the one
proven-safe existing SetVariable call site in this codebase produced
the identical crash -- not a timing issue. Localized with debug
markers (one boot): GetVariable works; SetVariable with real data
never returns. The existing "working" precedent call is actually a
delete-of-nonexistent-variable (size=0, data=NULL), a cheaper path
that never touches flash, so it proved nothing about real writes.
Root cause: this kernel's VMM never maps the region OVMF's variable
service needs for real flash writes -- a genuine gap in UEFI runtime-
services support, not Zuse-specific, and not obviously fixable in a
3-arch-uniform way (flash window location is firmware/arch-specific).
Independently, storing the raw seed in RUNTIME_ACCESS NVRAM would have
been a real security defect regardless of the crash -- readable by any
later-loaded UEFI app or the booted OS.
Reverted to a known-safe state: all NVRAM/mint code removed from
kernel_main.c, init.4th's ACL.4th line back to its documented
commented-out default. Verified clean compile and clean boot on all
three architectures. Cert storage expansion (the part that works)
stays. A dedicated system-identity disk (virtio-blk, already proven
for writes via Artemis) is the recommended next substrate -- not yet
decided or built. Full investigation documented in FABRIC-3.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01U14ET9CWAtbQMbYqomKgXd
Found that a pinned CONSTANT is not actually tamper-proof: ACL-PIN only
blocks redefinition, not a >BODY-then-store on the word's existing data
field. Moves the Zuse cert value into C-only VM struct fields
(zuse_cert_lo/hi + zuse_cert_installed fuse bit) with a one-time
vm_zuse_cert_install() and read-only ZUSE-CERT-LO@/HI@/INSTALLED? FORTH
accessors, closing the tamper path structurally instead of by convention.
Deletes the now-insecure ZUSE-CERT-LO/HI CONSTANT words from zuse.4th.
vm_zuse_cert_install() has no caller yet -- the real mint flow (Milestone
6 CA, the MINT word) is still open; this is storage + accessors only, not
a stand-in mint. Documented in FABRIC-3.md. Verified: hosted build clean,
mkcapsule --lint clean (31/31), clean boot to ok> on amd64/aarch64/riscv64
with Stadium conservation intact and no panics.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01U14ET9CWAtbQMbYqomKgXd
blk_subsys_detach_device() (block_subsystem.c) walks the device chain,
refuses removal of anything but the current tail (a mid-chain removal
would corrupt every later slot's start_lbn -- this architecture's own doc
already argues USB stays last specifically to avoid that), unlinks,
shrinks total_user_lbn, closes and frees the slot. Discards rather than
flushes dirty state -- the device is physically gone by the time this
runs (PORTSC disconnect only). Trigger wiring mirrors the attach path:
bot_msc_attached (set only once attach actually succeeds) gates a new
bot_msc_detach_pending flag set at PORTSC disconnect (not Disable Slot
completion, which is conditionally skipped and would miss concurrent
connect/disconnect pairs), consumed in sk_repl_idle().
Advisor flagged the real hazard ahead of time: block_words.c's VM block
window (blk_vm_lbn[]/blk_vm_cbuf[]) can go stale across a detach then a
same-LBN re-attach, and suggested a pointer-identity re-check in
blk_vm_load() as a minimal fix. That fix was implemented, then directly
falsified by its own designed-for-this test: attach a blank device, read
a block (populating the cache), detach, re-attach a device with distinct
content at the identical LBN, read again -- served stale content from
the first device. Root cause, confirmed live: glibc's allocator hands
free(slot) straight back to the very next same-size calloc(), so the
"fresh" and stale pointers were bitwise identical despite being two
different devices. Fixed properly with a monotonic blk_subsys_epoch()
counter (bumped on every attach/detach) checked by a new
blk_vm_check_epoch() helper at the one choke point (blk_vm_find(), plus
blk_vm_flush_all() which reads the same arrays directly) that covers
every path touching the window cache -- unfooled by address reuse.
Verified live with a new disk/usb-thumbdrive-test2.img fixture (distinct
content from the existing blank test image): attach A, read (cache hit
populated), detach, re-attach B at the same LBN, read again -- correctly
ran a fresh device read and returned B's real content, not A's stale
cached zeros. The failing pointer-comparison attempt's own capture log
kept as evidence, not deleted. All three architectures re-verified clean.
FABRIC-2.md Section X 2h marked complete -- enumeration through
hot-detach all live and verified; only WRITE(10) (2g's own still-open
item) remains unimplemented in the driver, not blocking anything here.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CXjAPTEKrgY2Mrk25KoLDn
Migrates Hermes's message/channel lifecycle onto the Stadium's unified
heat/capacity economy: MSG-ALLOC/FREE-NODE and CH-ALLOC/FREE-NODE now
route entirely through stadium_admit()/stadium_evict(), replacing the
old local free-list + independent heat-field mechanism. Eight
kernel-only STADIUM-* FORTH primitives (ADMIT, EVICT, RES@, RES-PULL,
RES-PUSH, HEAT@, HEAT!, WORD-HEAT), VM.stadium_vm_id threaded through
all three vm_core.c dispatch sites (replacing item 4.1's hardcoded
vm_uuid_hera()), and the stadium_owner[idx] fix so evict-credit lands
in the VM that actually admitted a patron, not whoever owned cell 0.
This session's own contribution, on top of that pre-existing
implementation: found and fixed two bugs blocking the item's own K≡1.0
conservation self-check (HERMES-K was reading 0, not 65536):
- Q.SLOT admission-heat fix (capsules/hermes/init.4th): MSG-SEND/
CH-ACCEPT admitted with Q.1 (the entire fleet-wide "1.0" unit) per
item, a leftover from before the Stadium migration when each
message/channel had its own unconstrained heat field. Instantly
drained the shared, finite reservoir.
- Reservoir floor for word-execution admission (stadium_words.c):
stadium_word_dispatch() (item 4.1) pulls STADIUM_WORD_HEAT_QUANTUM on
every word dispatch, not just first admission -- exhausts a VM's
entire reservoir in ~32 dispatches, starving any application-level
economy sharing that VM's reservoir before it gets a chance to pull
anything. word_dispatch_pull() now clamps word-execution's own pulls
to leave a Q48_ONE/3 floor (same fair-share figure COMMON-CH's own
floor already uses); application-level pulls are unaffected.
- STADIUM-WORD-HEAT primitive + stadium_words_resident_heat(): the
floor deliberately leaves word-execution residents holding real
heat, invisible to HERMES-K's original formula (MSG+CH+reservoir,
no term for word patrons). Adding this term closes K to exactly
65536 on all three architectures.
Also rules on two open scope questions in FABRIC.md: MBR-ALLOC/
MBR-FREE-NODE stay off the Stadium (membership records have no heat
field, never did -- the acceptance bullet's inclusion of them was a
completeness gesture predating a check of the actual layout), and
records the effort number (12 implementation files, +759/-120 lines).
Verified: all three architectures boot clean, full self-test passes,
Stadium conservation closes exactly (resident_sum + reservoir =
Q48_ONE) at both the C/Stadium level and the FORTH-level HERMES-K
check.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
