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Commits
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cc9521d2cc |
Retire emergency CLI: Zuse goes thumbdrive-resident, ACL.4th activated
Three tightly-coupled changes, verified together per Captain Bob's own "getting rid of the emergency cli" direction: 1. Zuse's identity is thumbdrive-resident, never system-resident. New zuse_genesis_marker_t (magic/version/zuse_pubkey[32]/crc) replaces zuse_cert_devblock_t's slot in the top-of-device fence -- the system now remembers only that a root identity exists and its pubkey, never a seed. zuse_cert_devblock_t is kept in the repo, marked superseded, no longer written by any code path. capsule_mint_identity() grows a genesis mode (issuer_vm=NULL): no cert is built or written (Zuse isn't verified against a separate signer -- she's recognized by pubkey match against the marker) and two new optional out-params (out_pubkey/out_seed) let the caller install the cert immediately after a genesis mint. New capsule_zuse_boot_try_attach() (capsule_zuse_boot.c), called from sk_repl_idle() on every fresh USB attach (the only point in the boot lifecycle a thumbdrive can actually be detected -- attach polling doesn't exist yet at kernel_main.c's old one-shot mint point, which is why that whole block is gone): no marker + blank drive -> genesis-mint; marker present + matching drive -> read its own user_identity_seed_t, install the cert. Either way, re-runs ACL-ZUSE-BOOT (zuse.4th) so zuse_session activates exactly like it always has for a same-boot cert install -- ACL-PIN only blocks redefinition, not re-execution, so no new C-side auth logic needed. 2. ACL.4th activated (capsules/init.4th) -- inactive all session until now. Found and fixed a real bug this immediately surfaced: zuse.4th's ACL-ZUSE-BOOT tried `['] ACL-ZUSE-BOOT ACL-PIN` from inside its own still-compiling definition -- the word isn't findable yet at that point, so the whole definition silently failed to compile every previous boot this session (dormant, since ACL.4th never loaded). Fixed: pin after the definition closes, not from within it -- it only needs to happen once anyway, and pinning doesn't block the re-invocation genesis/attach needs. 3. The unauthenticated emergency-CLI ACL bypass is retired (repl.c): `emergency_console = is_hera ? (zuse_session ? 0 : 1) : 0` deleted from both sk_repl_step and sk_repl_run. Every word run from Hera's own bare prompt now goes through ordinary ACL enforcement; emergency_console is driven only by the genuine C-level fault handler again. Added ZUSE-SESSION? (starforth_words.c), a read-only diagnostic matching ZUSE-PUBKEY@'s own precedent, to verify the whole chain directly rather than by inference. Verified end-to-end live in QEMU: fresh boot, no thumbdrive -> ZUSE-SESSION? reads 0. Attach a genuinely blank drive via QMP -> genesis mint fires automatically (no typing) -> ZUSE-SESSION? reads -1 (true). Hermes/Artemis both birth clean on all three architectures with ACL now actually enforced for the first time all session -- no denials, no UNKNOWN WORD beyond the deliberate POST self-test cases. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019ZGkimpfyh63EZyRkNbkPD |
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a8692681a8 |
Phase 8 C (5/n): Zuse's cert wired to the fence -- first-boot mint works
Replaces the crashed NVRAM approach entirely. New include/starkernel/zuse_cert_devblock.h: a standalone on-disk record (magic + version + 32-byte seed + 32-byte pubkey + a real CRC-64/ISO from day one, same discipline homeblocks_sig_t established) occupying devblock_from_top=0 of the fence. Its own header, not inlined at the boot call site, since the still-open MINT word will be a second consumer of this exact format. kernel_main.c's mint-or-load logic now reads the fence, installs an existing valid cert, or mints fresh via virtio_rng+ed25519_keygen and writes it. Runs right after virtio_rng_init(), before capsule_birth_mama() -- unlike the crashed NVRAM attempt, raw block I/O against Artemis's already-proven device has no boot-timing risk, so the earlier "re-invoke ACL-ZUSE-BOOT after Mama birth" workaround is gone; ACL.4th's self-activating ACL-ZUSE-BOOT sees a correct cert on its one ordinary pass. Verified independently across every real scenario, never trusting the kernel's own report: fresh mint decodes correctly on disk with a CRC confirmed by a from-scratch Python re-implementation of the algorithm; a reboot without reformatting loads back byte-for-byte identical seed/pubkey (genuinely "mint once, ever"); a pre-fence volume refuses cleanly (no crash, no silent data loss, honest "not persistent" reporting); the real, untouched disk/artemis.img exercises the same graceful-refusal path identically on all three architectures. Phase 8's core arc is now functionally complete: real entropy -> real signing -> real anti-file block-native persistence -> a first-boot mint that survives reboots. Still open: the ongoing MINT word for minting additional regular users. Documented in FABRIC-3.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01U14ET9CWAtbQMbYqomKgXd |