Robert Allan JamesandClaude Sonnet 5
e5cbc71f46
Cert storage expanded from the old 16-byte placeholder to a real 32-byte seed + 32-byte pubkey. vm_zuse_cert_install() now has a kernel-side duplicate in src/starkernel/vm/vm_core.c -- the kernel build's VM_EXCLUDE list drops src/vm.c entirely (same reason vm_set_base() already has two independent copies), so the hosted-only version added earlier this session was never actually linked into the kernel. FORTH-side ZUSE-CERT-LO@/HI@ replaced with ZUSE-PUBKEY@ (i -- u) over the public half only; ACL-ZUSE-BOOT now checks ZUSE-CERT-INSTALLED? before authenticating instead of unconditionally. Attempted NVRAM-based persistence (GetVariable/SetVariable) for the first-boot mint flow: page-faulted inside OVMF's variable service (CR2 in the flash MMIO window). Moving the call site to match the one proven-safe existing SetVariable call site in this codebase produced the identical crash -- not a timing issue. Localized with debug markers (one boot): GetVariable works; SetVariable with real data never returns. The existing "working" precedent call is actually a delete-of-nonexistent-variable (size=0, data=NULL), a cheaper path that never touches flash, so it proved nothing about real writes. Root cause: this kernel's VMM never maps the region OVMF's variable service needs for real flash writes -- a genuine gap in UEFI runtime- services support, not Zuse-specific, and not obviously fixable in a 3-arch-uniform way (flash window location is firmware/arch-specific). Independently, storing the raw seed in RUNTIME_ACCESS NVRAM would have been a real security defect regardless of the crash -- readable by any later-loaded UEFI app or the booted OS. Reverted to a known-safe state: all NVRAM/mint code removed from kernel_main.c, init.4th's ACL.4th line back to its documented commented-out default. Verified clean compile and clean boot on all three architectures. Cert storage expansion (the part that works) stays. A dedicated system-identity disk (virtio-blk, already proven for writes via Artemis) is the recommended next substrate -- not yet decided or built. Full investigation documented in FABRIC-3.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01U14ET9CWAtbQMbYqomKgXd
capsules/
FORTH personality files loaded by the VM at boot. A capsule is an immutable, content-addressed payload; its XXHash64 hash is its identity. Any mutation changes the hash and the birth protocol rejects the image.
Key files
| File | Type | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
init.4th |
(m) MAMA_INIT |
Default Mama VM personality — loaded at LBN 2048 |
ACL.4th |
user | Word-level ACL system; self-activating at boot |
zuse.4th |
user | Bootstrap superuser; loaded by ACL.4th |
doe.4th |
user | DoE workload words (EXEC-DOE) — opt-in |
init-0.4th … init-9.4th |
(p) |
Numbered personality variants |
init-l8-*.4th |
(p) |
L8 Jacquard mode variants (stable/volatile/diverse/temporal/transition/omni) |
hermes/init.4th |
(p) |
Hermes baby VM personality |
artemis/init.4th |
(p) |
Artemis baby VM personality |
Block namespace
Block ranges are shared across all loaded capsules — collisions cause silent word-definition overwrites.
| Range | Owner |
|---|---|
| 2048–2099 | init.4th |
| 2100–2199 | doe.4th |
| 3000–3999 | workload capsules |
| 4000+ | user-defined (ACL.4th, zuse.4th, …) |
Each block is limited to 1024 bytes. Verify with wc -c before committing.
See also
experiments/bare_metal/README.md— DoE protocols and block namespace rulesdocs/03-architecture/word-acl/DESIGN.md— ACL system designtools/mkcapsule.c— assembles capsules intocapsule_generated.c- Project root